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INTRODUCTION 
The  idea  that  inflation  is  strongly  influenced  by 
monetary  growth-once  actively  debated  within  the 
economics  profession-is  readily  accepted  by  a  large 
majority  of  economists  today,  especially  with  respect 
to  the  United  States.  While  disagreements  persist 
over  such  issues  as  the  precise  manner  in  which 
monetary  growth  fosters  inflation,  the  length  of  lags 
between  changes  in  the  money  supply  and  related 
changes  in  the  price  level,  the  importance  of  non- 
monetary  causes  of inflation,  and  the  optimal  strategy 
for  reducing  inflation,  there  is  an  impressive  body  of 
empirical  evidence  supporting  the  linkage  between 
money  and  U.  S.  inflation  throughout  its  history. 
Outside  the  United  States  there  is  less  agreement 
on  the  sources  of  inflation.  No  other  country  has 
been  subjected  to  as  much  empirical  analysis  by  so 
many  independent  researchers  as  the  United  States, 
so  there  is  more  room  for  differences  of  opinion. 
Moreover,  in  most  of  the  leading  industrial  nations 
there  are  reasons  for  thinking  that  various  nonmone- 
tary  factors  have  distorted  the  relationship  between 
monetary  growth  and  inflation.  For  example,  these 
countries  are  far  less  self-sufficient  than  the  United 
States,  and  most  of  them  have  relied  more  aggres- 
sively  on  price-wage  controls.  In  addition,  several 
European  countries  have  revamped  their  tax  systems 
during  the  last  decade  or  two  in  ways  that  may  have 
affected  the  standard  inflation  measures. 
This  article  examines  the  impact  of  monetary 
growth  on  inflation  in  fourteen  industrial  economies. 
The  countries  studied  and  their  rates  of  inflation 
since  1958  are  displayed  in  Table  I  and  in  Chart  1. 
We  begin  by  developing  a  simple  model  of  inflation 
in  Section  I.  Then  in  Section  II  we  present  regres- 
sion  results  for  all  countries,  employing  as  nearly  as 
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possible  a  common  model  specification.  In  this  way 
we  hope  to  gain  insights  into  similarities  and  differ- 
ences  across  countries  with  respect  to  the  role  of 
monetary  growth  in  recent  inflations.  Section  III 
subjects  the  general  findings  to  further  analysis  in  an 
attempt  to  extract  some  broader  implications  from 
the  results.  The  major  conclusions  are  summarized 
in  Section  IV.  An  appendix  contains  detailed  regres- 
sion  equations  for  individual  countries. 
Obviously,  a  study  of  this  sort  is  subject  to  various 
hazards  and  limitations.  By  attempting  to  examine  a 
large  number  of  countries  we  are  necessarily  super- 
ficial  in  our  treatment  of  any  single  country.  Coun- 
tries  differ  greatly  in  institutional  frameworks  and 
macro-policies,  and  these  are  unlikely  to  get  the 
attention  they  deserve.  Further,  by  applying  a  com- 
mon  model  to  all  countries  we  run  the  risk  of  ig- 
Table  I 
MEAN  RATES  OF  INFLATION,  1958  to  1977, 
SELECTED  COUNTRIES  OF  EUROPE 
AND  NORTH  AMERICA 
Mean  Standard 
Country  Inflation  Rate*  Deviations 
(percent) 
Austria  4.43  5.02 
Belgium  4.50  3.84 
Britain  6.86  7.09 
Canada  4.22  3.44 
Denmark  6.59  5.49 
France  6.19  4.02 
Germany  3.47  3.03 
Italy  6.71  6.51 
Netherlands  4.95  5.46 
Norway  5.61  4.92 
Sweden  5.07  4.28 
Switzerland  3.77  3.51 
United  States  3.94  2.50 
Yugoslavia  11.46  12.28 
*  Except  for  the  U.  S.,  where  the  GNP  implicit  deflator  is  used, 
inflation  is  measured  by  the  annualized  quarter-to-quarter  per- 
cent  change  in  the  consumer  price  index. 
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country.  We  recognize  these  trade-offs,  but  we  leave 
to  others  the  task  of  building  more  elegant  theoretical 
models  and  more  precise  empirical  formulations. 
I. 
A  FRAMEWORK  OF  ANALYSIS 
Money  and  Inflation  It  will  be  helpful  at  the 
outset  to  provide  a  general  analytic  framework  that 
encompasses  both  monetary  and  nonmonetary  sources 
of  inflation.  Figure  1  shows  hypothetical  demand 
and  supply  curves  for  total  output  for  an  entire  econ- 
omy.  The  curve  labeled  AD  is  referred  to  by 
economists  as  an  “aggregate  demand”  curve.  Its 
downward  slope  indicates  that  the  quantity  of  output 
demanded  will  be  greater  at  a  lower  level  of  prices 
than  at  a  higher  level.  Similarly,  the  upward  slope 
of  the  AS  curve  (i.e.,  “aggregate  supply”)  assumes 
that  producers  will  provide more  goods  and  services 
at  higher  prices  than  at  lower  prices.  In  equilibrium, 
the  price  level  (P)  and  the  level  of  output  (Q)  are 
established  by  the  intersection  of  AD  and  AS. 
For  present  purposes  there  is  little  point  in  striving 
for  greater  rigor  in  our  formulations  of  AD  and  AS.’ 
The  important  point  to  recognize  is  that  P  may  rise 
-i.e.,  inflation  may  occur-either  because  of  a  right- 
ward  shift  in  AD  or  because  of  a  leftward  shift  in 
1 See,  for  example,  Dornbusch  and  Fischer  [4],  chaps. 
11 and  12. 
Figure  1 
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AS.  The  precise  shapes  of  the  curves  and  the  exact 
nature  of  the  forces  that  may  bring  about  inflationary 
shifts  are  secondary  issues  as  far  as  this  article  is 
concerned. 
Economists  hold  that  monetary  growth  influences, 
inflation  by  affecting  the  position  of  the  AD  curve. 
Ordinarily  a  rise  in  the  volume  of  money,  M,  will 
increase  the  nation’s  demand  for  goods  and  services; 
hence  AD  will  move  to  the  right  and,  under  stable 
supply  conditions,  P  will  rise.  There  is  less  than 
unanimity  among  economists  about  the  relative  im- 
portance  of  changes  in  M  and  various  other  disturb- 
ances  that  might  conceivably  produce  shifts  in  AD 
in  the  real  world.  For  example,  those  who  continue 
to  view  the  world  in  terms  of  “Keynesian”  models 
are  apt  to  emphasize  the  importance  of  fiscal  policies 
(quite  apart  from  the  monetary  implications  of  these 
policies)  as  determinants  of  AD.2  But  even  the 
Keynesians  concede  that  monetary  growth  usually 
will  result  in  inflation,  unless  it  is  matched  by  an 
equally  rapid  increase  in  AS. 
Of  course,  inflation  can  come  about  because  of 
nonmonetary  disturbances.  Supply  conditions  change 
from  time  to  time,  and  the  inflationary  consequences 
need  not  be  negligible.  During  the  1970s,  in  fact, 
there  were  some  notable  “supply  shocks”  relating  to 
energy  and  food.  Thus  as  Alfred  Marshall  reminded 
us  nearly  a  century  ago,  there  are  two  blades  to  the 
scissors.  Failure  to  take  account  of  the  supply 
“blade”  may  well  result  in  biased  estimates  of  the 
role  played  by  monetary  growth  and  other  demand 
disturbances. 
An  Empirical  Model  of  Inflation  One  approach 
to  an  investigation  of  real-world  inflations  would  be 
to  develop  full-blown  aggregate  demand  and  supply 
functions  along  the  lines  of  the  figure  and  to  solve 
them  simultaneously  to  determine  both  the  inflation 
rate  and  the  rate  of  growth  of  output.  We  do  not 
adopt  this  “structural  model”  approach.  Instead  we 
work  with  a  single-equation  model  that  represents  a 
modified  version  of  the  ancient  Equation  of  Ex- 
change,  MV  =  PQ,  where  V  is  the  velocity  or  turn- 
over  rate  of  money  and  the  other  symbols  are  as 
previously  defined.  For  our  purposes  it  is  convenient 
to  rearrange  terms,  add  time  subscripts,  and  convert 
from  levels  to  rates  of  change  by  taking  logarithmic 
first  differences: 
pt  =  Vt -  qt  +  mt.  (1) 
2 An  example  may  be  found  in  Blinder  [2.]. 
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are  identities.  In  order  to  transform  equation  (1) 
into  a  theory  of  inflation  we  must  impose  constraints 
on  the  behavior  of  one  or  more  of  the  variables  on 
the  right-hand  side.  One  very  simple  constraint 
would  be  to  assume  that  the  sum  of  the  growth  rates 
of  velocity  and  output,  vt  and  qt,  is  equal  to  a  con- 
stant: 
Vt -  qt  =  k.  (2) 
This  assumption  allows  the  levels  of  V  and  Q,  and 
their  growth  rates,  to  vary  over  time.  By  substituting 
(2)  into  (l),  we  obtain  (3),  which  is  not  an  iden- 
tity-: 
Pt  =  k  +  bmt.  (3) 
Note  that  the  coefficient  b  which  we  have  inserted 
into  (3)  is  necessarily  equal  to  unity  in  this  simple 
model. 
Equation  (3)  is  not  yet  a  promising  hypothesis  for 
empirical  testing  since  it  takes  no  account  of  mone- 
tary  lags.  A  large  amount  of  earlier  work  has  estab- 
lished  that  changes  in  monetary  growth  rates  do  not 
have  immediate  effects,  either  on  real  economic  ac- 
tivity  or  on  prices3  In  the  case  of  prices,  most  U.  S. 
studies  have  found  average  lags  ranging  between  one 
and  a  half  and  three  years.  While  the  reasons  for 
such  long  lags  are  not  entirely  understood,  neither 
are  they  wholly  surprising,  given  the  prevalence  of 
government-imposed  price  constraints  in  contempo- 
rary  economies.  Examples  include  the  prices  of 
goods  and  services  that  are  provided,  directly  by 
governments  (e.g.,  postal  rates  and  bus  fares),  as 
well  as  prices  of  private  firms  that  are  set  by  regula- 
tory  bodies  (e.g.,  electricity  and  telephone  rates). 
We  allow  for  monetary  lags  by  substituting  a  lag 
expression  for  mt: 
(4) 
There  is  little  basis  in  theory  for  preferring  a  par- 
ticular  pattern  for  the  weighting  coefficients,  wi.  All 
of  the-  results  reported  in  this  article  were  obtained 
from  polynomial  distributed  lag  functions  (“Almon” 
lags)  using  third  degree  polynomials,  a  specification 
that  is  compatible  with  a  wide  variety  of  weight 
configurations. 
A  second  problem  with  (3),  and  with  (4)  as  well, 
is  that  it  ignores  supply  shocks.  A  related  omission 
in  these  models  is  that  they  ignore  the  impact  of 
price-wage  controls.  When  effective,  such  controls 
3 A  useful  recent  discussion  of  the  rates  of  monetary 
growth  and  inflation  may  be  found-in  Carlson  [3].  See 
also  Berman  [1]  and  Karnosky  [5]. 
may  result  in  disequilibrium  situations-i.e.,  combi- 
nations  of  P  and  Q  at  points  other  than  intersections 
of AD  and  AS.  Still  another  type  of occasional  shock 
arises  when  countries  engage  in  major  revampings 
of  their  tax  systems,  the  most  relevant  example  being 
the  introduction  of  broad-based  value-added  taxes 
(VATS),  usually  as  substitutes  for  other  types  of 
expenditure  taxes,  in  several  European  countries 
during  the  1960s  and  1970s.  There  is  no  reason  to 
think  that  either  AD  or  AS  will  be  affected  perma- 
nently  by  such  a  shift;  the  only  significant  lasting 
effects  would  appear  to  be  changes  in  the  relative 
price  structure.  In  the  short  run,  however,  the  tran- 
sition  to  VAT  might  well  cause  an  inflationary  spurt, 
especially  if  inflation  is  measured  by  a  price  index 
whose  scope  is  rather  narrow.  Prices  of  newly  taxed 
items  would  rise  while  prices  of  items  that  are  now 
taxed  less  heavily  than  before  might  be  slow  to  fall. 
Moreover,  there  might  be  a  temporary  surge  of  de- 
mand  for  durable  goods  immediately  prior  to  the  tax 
change,  to  be  followed  later  by  a  fall-off  in  demand. 
It  also  is  not  unlikely  that  the  central  bank  would 
attempt  to  accommodate  the  implied  short-run  rise 
in  velocity  (and  in  interest  rates)  by  a  “one-time” 
rise  in  M.  In  this  latter  case,  of  course,  AD  would 
shift  to  the  right  and  there  would  be  a  permanent 
rise  in  P-and  a  transitory  increase  in  the  rate  of  in- 
flation.  But  even  if  the  central  bank  does  not  adopt 
an  accommodative  policy,  one  would  expect  a  transi- 
tory  jump  in  the  inflation  rate. 
A  simple  but  effective  way  of  dealing  with  these 
“shocks”  is  to  introduce  dummy  variables  with  values 
of  1  in  the  quarters  when  the  shocks  occur,  and 
values  of  0  in  all  other  quarters.  Thus  we  have: 
(5) 
where  there  are  m  separate  shock  dummies,  Dj,  and 
the  aj  are  their  estimated  regression  coefficients.  In 
some  instances  it  is  possible  to  adopt  the  more  so- 
phisticated  procedure  of  constructing  time  series  to 
measure  the  intensity  of  shocks.  This  can  be  done 
for  energy  by  introducing  the  rate  of  change  in  rela- 
tive  energy  prices  as  an  explanatory  variable.  Simi- 
larly,  rather  than  rely  on  a  crude  VAT  dummy  equal 
to  1 in  the  initial  quarter  of  the  tax  and  0  in  all  other 
quarters,  it  seems  preferable  to  substitute  a  time 
series  of  changes  in  actual  VAT  rates.  This  enables 
us  to  take  account  of  the  impact  on  inflation  (if  any) 
resulting  from  subsequent  rate  manipulations,  which 
have  been  substantial  in  some  countries.  Incorporat- 
ing  these  latter  modifications,  we  obtain: 
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where  pE, is  the  relative  price  of  energy  and  T  is  the 
change  in  the  standard  tax  rate  under  VAT. 
The  empirical  results  presented  in  Section  II  are 
derived  from  equations  (5)  and  (6).  There  are 
additional  problems,  however,  in  formulations  such 
as  (3)  which,  though  not  addressed  directly  in  the 
work  reported  in  Section  II,  must  be  mentioned 
briefly  at  this  point.  These  problems  relate  to  the 
treatment  of  inflation  expectations,  the  nature  and 
importance  of  international  transmission  mechanisms, 
and  the  possibility  of  “reverse  causality”  running 
from  inflation  to  monetary  growth. 
It  has  become  common  in  recent  studies  of  infla- 
tion  to  work  with  models  that  make  the  current  rate 
of  inflation  p  a  function  of  expected  inflation,  p*, 
plus  other  variables  such  as  the  size  of  the  gap  be- 
tween  actual  and  potential  real  GNP.  In  such  a 
model,  monetary  growth  influences  p  largely  through 
its  effect  on  p*.  Since  p*  is  considered  to  depend 
primarily  on  the  trend  rate  of  monetary  growth, 
transitory  deviations  of  monetary  growth  from  its 
trend  are  expected  to  have  little  impact  on  inflation. 
At  the  same  time,  factors  other  than  the  trend  rate  of 
monetary  growth-e.g.,  the  inflation  rate  in  countries 
that  are  important  trade  partners-are  held  by  some 
economists  to  play  a  role  in  determining  p*.  We 
shall  return  to  this  topic  in  Section  III. 
Even  casual  inspection  of  the  chart  on  pages  24 
and  25  suggests  that  inflation  rates  are  highly  corre- 
lated  across  countries.4  Nevertheless,  despite  a  liter- 
ature  on  the  international  transmission  of  inflation 
which  has  grown  rapidly  both  in  size  and  complexity 
in  recent  years,  there  is  considerable  disagreement 
over  the  nature  of  the  transmission  mechanism.  One 
simple  hypothesis,  which  of course  is  compatible  with 
equations  (5)  and  (6),  is  that  a  country’s  rate  of 
monetary  growth  is  influenced  by  the  rate  of  inflation 
in  other  countries.  This  is  a  plausible  hypothesis 
under  a  regime  of  fixed  exchange  rates  such  as 
existed  for  most  of  our  study  period  up  to  the  winter 
of  1973,  and  it  is  also  relevant  to  a  situation  in  which 
central  banks  engage  in  “dirty  floating”  to  moderate 
the  swings  in  nominally  flexible  exchange  rates. 
According  to  this  view,  a  country  that  was  able  to 
insulate  its  monetary  growth  rate  from  such  external 
influences  would  be  able  to  “go  its  own  way”  with 
respect  to  inflation.  An  alternative  (though  not 
4 See  Table  V  for  a  matrix  of  simple  correlation  coeffi- 
cients  of  inflation  rates. 
mutually  exclusive)  hypothesis  argues  that  inflation 
can  be  transmitted  from  one  country  to  another  inde- 
pendently  of  any  immediate  effect  on  the  recipient 
country’s  monetary  growth  rate  through  a  process 
known  as  “goods  arbitrage.”  Thus  a  rise  in  the 
price  of  (say)  automobiles  in  country  A  will  soon 
result  in  higher  auto  prices  in  country  B  as  traders 
switch  orders  from  the  high-price  suppliers  to  those 
with  lower  prices.  The  rise  in  auto  prices  in  B,  ac- 
cording  to  this  hypothesis,  will  be  followed  by  more 
rapid  monetary  growth  in  B  as  its  central  bank  ac- 
quires  foreign  exchange  and  expands  bank  reserves. 
In  both  hypotheses  about  the  transmission  mecha- 
nism,  it  should  be  noted,  there  will  be  a  rise  in  mone- 
tary  growth  associated  with  an  increase  in  inflation. 
However,  the  causal  roles  played  by  monetary 
growth  under  these  alternative  scenarios  are  entirely 
different. 
This  leads,  finally,  to  the  closely  related  issue  of 
reverse  causality.  In  our  discussion  of  equations  (5) 
and  (6)  we  assumed  implicitly  that  the  rate  of  mone- 
tary  growth  is  determined  in  each  country  by  the 
policies  of  its  own  central  bank.  This  is  not  to  deny 
the  existence  of  various  feedback  mechanisms  where- 
by  monetary  growth  can  be  influenced  by  the  be- 
havior  of  banks  and  their  customers;  it  simply 
assumes  that  such  feedbacks  can  be  neutralized  by 
the  central  bank’s  policies.  We  have  already  noted 
that  under  a  regime  of  fixed  exchange  rates  a  cen- 
tral  bank  will  be  obliged  to  establish  whatever  mone- 
tary  growth  rate  is  compatible  with  maintaining  the 
official  exchange  rate.  Even  in  a  closed  economy, 
however,  one  can  imagine  situations  (e.g.,  adherence 
through  thick  and  through  thin  to  an  interest-rate  or 
unemployment  objective)  in  which  the  monetary 
growth  rate  would  not  be  the  focal  point  of  policy 
deliberations.  By  and  large  we  shall  ignore  such 
issues,  just  as  we  ignore  any  consideration  of  formal 
money-supply  models.  Undoubtedly  this  topic  will 
receive  attention  from  other  researchers. 
II. 
THE  MAIN  EMPIRICAL  FINDINGS 
The  basic  regression  results  for  all  fourteen  coun- 
tries  are  summarized  in  Table  II.  More  detailed 
results  may  be  found  in  the  appendix.  For  eleven 
countries  the  estimations  were  based  on  two  complete 
decades  of.  quarterly  data,  extending  from  1958  I 
through  1977  IV.  Shorter  periods  were  used  in  the 
cases  of  Britain  and  Norway  because  of  data  limita- 
tions;  in  the  case  of  Germany,  because  the  long- 
period  results  were  unsatisfactory. 
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able  is  the  annualized  percent  change  in  consumer 
prices.  U.  S.  regressions  were  run  with  both  the 
CPI  and  the  GNP  implicit  deflator;  while  the  results 
were  very  similar,  those  with  GNP  prices  had 
slightly  higher  R2s,  and  they  alone  are  reported  here. 
Monetary  growth  rates  were  calculated  from  narrow 
measures  of money  in  most  instances.  One  exception 
is  Yugoslavia,  where  currency  was  used.  Another  is 
Norway,  where  we  found  a  much  stronger  effect  of 
monetary  growth  on  inflation  when  money  was  de- 
fined  broadly.  Britain  provides  a  similar  exception: 
British  Ml  produces  much  poorer  results  than  the 
broad  M3  measure,  which  includes  even  non-sterling 
deposits  held  by  residents  in  British  banks.  In  the 
United  States,  as  well  as  most  other  countries,  on  the 
other  hand,  narrow  money  is  more  closely  related  to 
inflation  rates  than  broad  money  is.  Since  we  have 
no  preconceptions  about  which  money  measure  to 
use,  we  have  selected  whichever  measure  provides 
the  best  statistical  fit.  Discussion  of  various  other 
data  problems  is  left  to  the  appendix. 
The  first  and  most  important  point  to  be  noted  in 
Table  II  is  that  in  every  country  there  is  a  sta- 
tistically  significant  relationship  between  monetary 
growth  and  inflation.  In  two  instances-Denmark 
and  France-the  summed  monetary  coefficients  just 
barely  passed  the  five  percent  significance  test;  the 
remaining  countries’  monetary  coefficients  were  sig- 
nificant  at  the  one  percent  level.  The  monetary 
Table  II 
SUMMARY  OF  BASIC  INFLATION  REGRESSIONS 
Country 
Regression 
Number  Period 
Sum  of  Mean 
Money  Monetary  Monetary 
Measure  Coefficients  Lag 
Used  (t statistics)  (t statistics) 
Standard  Durbin-  Other  Variables 
Error  of  Watson  Included in 
Regression  Statistic  Regression 
Austria  1.2 
Belgium  2.2 
Britain  3.4 
Canada  4.2 
Denmark  5.3 











Switzerland  12.2 
United  States  13.4 
Yugoslavia  14.2 
581-77lV  Ml 
581-77lV  Ml 
63l-771V  M3 
581-77lV  Ml 
5Bl-771V  Ml 
5Bl-771V  Ml 
64l-771V  Ml 
5Bl-771V  Ml 
58l-77lV  Ml 
64l-771V  M2 
58l-771V  Ml 
581-77lV  Ml 
58l-771V  MlB 





























8.9  .735 
.672  2.21  2.03*  C,PCRELPEN0  to -5 
.393  3.93  2.29  C,S,PCRELPEN-1  to -2 
.531  3.72  2.06* 
4.7  .681 
.311  3.32  1.98* 
.742  1.53 
.695  3.64  2.14* 
9.4  .626  3.36  2.42 
.616 
.797 
8.5  .628 
.516  2.46  1.58  C,S,PCRELPEN0  to -5 
























3.79  1.79 
1.93  1.90 
C,S,PCRELPEN0  to -5, 
WPCON 
C,PCRELPEN0  to -5 




3.04  1.99 
C,S,PCRELPEN0  to -5, 
VATCHNGE 
C,PCRELPEN0  to -3, 
WPCON 





1.13  1.74 
7.52  2.06* 
C,PCRELPEN-1  to -4, 
WPCON 
C,S,REFORM 
* Cochrane-Orcutt  Procedure  was  applied. 
**  In  the  case of  France,  the  Almon  Lag  Procedure  war  applied  to  the  current  and  15  lagged  quarterly  monetary  growth  rates. 
Glossary:  C,  constant;  DECON,  dummy  variable  =  1  in  quarter  following  suspension  of  wage-price  controls;  OIL,  dummy  variable  =  1 
in  73lV  to 7411; PCRELPEN,  percent  change  in  ratio  of  energy  prices  to  all  consumer  prices;  REFORM,  dummy  variable  =  1  in  65111; 
S,  seasonal  dummy  variables;  VATCHNGE,  quarter-to-quarter  change in  standard  value-added  tax  rate;  WPCON,  dummy  variable  =  1 
in  quarters  of  comprehensive  (and  binding)  wage-price  controls. 
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FEDERAL  RESERVE BANK  OF  RICHMOND  25 coefficients  vary  from  country  to  country,  ranging 
between  a  low  of  .431  in  France  and  a  high  of  1.693 
in  Sweden. 
A  second  interesting  aspect  of  Table  II  is  the  evi- 
dence  that  monetary  growth  ‘affects  inflation  with 
long  lags.  Mean  monetary  lags  range  from  a  little 
over  one  year  in  Canada  (4.7  quarters)  to  more  than 
three  years  (13.2  quarters)  in  Norway.  The  esti- 
mates  of  mean  monetary  lags  were  significant  at  the 
five  percent  level  in  every  country  except  France 
and  Germany. 
Except  for  France,  all  of  the  regression  equations 
summarized  in  Table  II  includes  variables  other  than 
lagged  monetary  growth  rates.  The  most  common 
additional  variable  is  PCRELPEN,  the  quarter-to- 
quarter  percent  change  in  the  relative  price  of  ener- 
gy.5  We  were  interested  to  find  that  energy  prices 
did  not  have  a  statistically  significant  effect  on  the 
inflation  rate  in  five  countries:  Austria,  France,  the 
Netherlands,  Norway,  and  Yugoslavia.  However, 
in  the  Austrian  equation  the  t-ratio  on  PCRELPEN 
narrowly  missed  the  five  percent  significance  level, 
and  the  French  equation  for  1968  I  to  1977  IV  (6.2) 
shows  high  significance  levels  for  this  variable.  Thus 
in  all  but  a  couple  of  countries  it  appears  that  the 
relative  price  of  energy  played  an  important  role  in 
the  inflations  of  1958-77. 
We  obtained  mixed  results  with  regard  to  the 
impact  of  changes  in  value-added  tax  rates.  Four 
countries-Canada,  Switzerland,  the  United  States, 
and  Yugoslavia-have  not  adopted  this  form  of  tax- 
ation.  In  the  case  of  Sweden,  the  rate  of  inflation  is 
calculated  net  of  changes  in  VAT  rates.  Among  the 
remaining  nine  countries,  we  failed  to  find  significant 
coefficients  on  VATCHNGE  (the  quarter-to-quarter 
change  in  the  standard  tax  rate)  in  Austria,  Belgium, 
Britain,  France,  and  Italy.  This  may  reflect  the  rela- 
tively  low  tax  rates  in  some  countries,  the  narrow 
scope  of  items  that  are  taxed  at  the  standard  rate,  or 
the  fact  that  VAT  may  have  replaced  earlier  excises 
on  consumer  goods.  However,  in  countries  such  as 
Denmark,  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  and  Norway 
it  is  clear  that  changes  in  VAT  have  had  major  (but 
transitory)  effects  on  the  rate  of  inflation.  Denmark 
has relied  heavily  on  frequent  changes  in  VAT  rates 
as  a  tool  of  macro-stabilization. 
Finally,  every  country  except  Germany  and  Swit- 
zerland  experimented  with  direct  wage-price  controls 
during  1958-77.  Our  attempts  to  use  dummy  vari- 
5 We  were  unable  to  calculate  this  variable  for  Sweden 
and  Yugoslavia.  For  Sweden  we  relied  instead  on  an 
OIL  dummy  (equal  to  one  in  731V  and  741)  with  good 
results. 
ables  to  gauge  the  impacts  of  these  controls  on  the 
behavior  of  inflation  rates  were  only  partially  suc- 
cessful.  Controls  dummies  (“WPCON”)  had  sig- 
nificant  negative  coefficients  in  just  four  countries: 
Britain  (65111-6711  and  761-76IV),  Italy  (73III- 
73IV),  Sweden  (70IV-7III),  and  the  United  States 
(71III-721V).  A  plausible  explanation  of  our  fail- 
ures  in  other  countries  is  that  many  controls  pro- 
grams  are  not  severely  binding,  due  either  to  loose 
administration  or  to  explicit  loopholes.  Another 
problem  is  that  controls  typically  are  dismantled 
piecemeal,  which  forces  the  researcher  to  make  an 
arbitrary  decision  about  the  effective  time  span  of 
WPCON.  In  countries  such  as  Austria,  France,  and 
the  Netherlands  there  is  a  further  difficulty:  inter- 
ventionist  policies  are  applied  so  continuously  in 
these  countries  that  one  is  hard-pressed  to  identify 
periods  that  are  free  of  controls. 
In  summary,  the  regression  results  displayed  in 
Table  II  provide  strong  evidence  of  a  link  between 
monetary  growth  and  inflation  in  Canada,  Yugo- 
slavia,  and  most  of  the  industrialized  democracies  of 
Western  and  Central  Europe  quite  similar  to  the 
linkage  that  is  known  to  exist  in  the  United  States. 
Given  the  wide  differences  among  these  countries  in 
institutional  settings  and  policy  strategies,  these  find- 
ings  suggest  that  the  linkage  between  monetary 
growth  and  inflation  is  indeed  robust. 
III. 
SOME  FURTHER  RESULTS 
The  empirical  results  in  Table  II  are  of  consider- 
able  interest  as  they  stand.  There  are,  however,  a 
number  of  unanswered  questions  that  demand  addi- 
tional  investigation.  For  example,  has  the  inflation- 
monetary  growth  linkage  been  stable  over  time  ?  In 
particular,  is  there  any  indication  that  lags  have  be- 
come  shorter  in  recent  years?  Then  there  is  the 
complicated  issue  of  reverse  causality  which  was 
mentioned  in  Section  I.  Still  another  important  issue 
relates  to  the  international  transmission  of  inflation. 
We  cannot  provide  definitive  answers  to  any  of  these 
questions  in  the  space  that  is  available.  Nevertheless 
we  do  have  some  pertinent  evidence  to  present. 
Stability  Over  Time  A  major  impediment  to  the 
development  of  economic  science  is  the  tendency  for 
human  behavior  to  change  over  time.  This  may  result 
from  alterations  in  the  basic  institutional  setting. 
Even  in  a  stable  setting,  however,  people  discover 
new  ways  of  attaining  goals,  and  even  their  goals 
shift.  Indeed,  it  has  often  been  noted  that  economics 
tends  to  be  self-invalidating,  in  the  sense  that  the 
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regularity  in  economic  behavior  tends  to  cause 
changes  in  behavior  as  individuals  begin  to  utilize 
the  information  for  personal  gain. 
The  economics  of  inflation  is  not  exempt  from  this 
hazard.  As  inflation  persists  over  time,  individuals 
are  likely  to  become  more  sophisticated  in  protecting 
themselves  from  its  consequences.  One  result  might 
well  be  a  shortening  of  the  lag  between  monetary 
growth  and  inflation.  Thus  regression  equations 
based  on  one  period’s  data  may  fit  poorly  a  different 
set  of  observations.  In  fact,  this  could  occur  even 
without  behavior  changes  if  the  basic  institutional 
setting  undergoes  major  transformations.  An  ex- 
ample  might  be  the  transition  from  pegged  to  flexible 
exchange  rates  early  in  1973.  Clearly,  therefore,  we 
need  to  investigate  the  temporal  stability  of  the  link- 
age  between  monetary  growth  and  inflation. 
The  stability  issue  can  be  investigated  in  three 
ways.  First,  we  can  see  how  closely  these  inflation 
equations,  which  were  derived  from  data  through 
1977,  fit  post-sample  observations  for  1978-80.  Sec- 
ond,  we  can  compare  parameter  estimates  obtained 
within  subperiods  of  the  overall  data  set.  Third,  we 
can  examine  estimates  of  the  mean  monetary  lags  in 
earlier  and  more  recent  periods  to  see  whether  they 
appear  to  have  changed.  Since  it  would  be  extremely 
tedious  to  review  all  of  the  available  evidence  under 
each  of  these  headings,  we  will  limit  ourselves  to  a 
few  summary  statements. 
1.  The  weight  of  evidence  supports  the  conclusion 
that  money-based  inflation  equations  of  the  sort  pre- 
sented  in  this  article  have  been  rather  unstable  since 
1958.  We  do  not  know  how  these  equations  compare 
with  alternative  inflation  equations  in  this  respect. 
2.  With  one  or  two  exceptions  (e.g.,  Germany  and 
Denmark),  the  money-based  equations  did  not  do 
notably  well  in  “predicting”  inflation  rates  in  1978- 
80.  This  is  hardly  surprising,  given  the  economic 
turbulence  of  the  period  and  the  poor  track  record  of 
alternative  models. 
3.  Separate  regressions  for  1958-67  and  1968-77 
sometimes  produced  widely  differing  monetary 
growth  coefficients.  An  extreme  example  is  Italy, 
whose  sum  of  monetary  growth  coefficients  was  .792 
in  a  1958-67  estimation  compared  with  2.180  in  a 
similar  specification  for  1968-77.  On  the  other  hand, 
in  Switzerland  the  estimates  were  virtually  identical 
over  the  same  periods  (.614  vs.  .596).  It  should  be 
noted,  of  course,  that.  short-period  regressions  in- 
volving  cycle-sensitive  variables  would  be  expected  to 
display  considerable  instability. 
4.  There  is  no  convincing  evidence  in  these  re- 
gressions  of  a  general  shortening  (or  lengthening, 
for  that  matter)  of  lags  between  changes  in  monetary 
growth  rates  and  inflation  rates.  Table  III  compares 
mean  lag  estimates  calculated  from  1958-67  and 
1968-77  regressions  for  the  six  countries  in  which 
statistically  significant  estimates  were  obtained  in 
both  periods.  In  Britain,  Switzerland,  and  the  United 
States  lags  were  shorter  in  the  more  recent  period; 
in  Belgium,  Italy,  and  the  Netherlands  the  opposite 
was  true. 
Reverse  Causality  As  was  noted  briefly  in  Sec- 
tion  I,  the  existence  of  a  close  historical  relationship 
between  monetary  growth  and  inflation-such  as  we 
have  found  in  all  fourteen  countries-can  be  inter- 
preted  in  various  ways,  as  far  as  causality  is  con- 
cerned.  We  have  suggested  that  the  main  line  of 
causality  runs  from  monetary  growth  to  inflation 
rather  than  the  other  way  around.  The  fact  that  long 
lags  were  found  between  monetary  growth  and  infla- 
tion  does  not  “prove”  that  our  interpretation  is  cor- 
rect.  However,  it  does  represent  a  challenge  to  the 
proponents  of  reverse  causality  to  formulate  a  hy- 
pothesis  that  is  capable  of  explaining  how  changes  in 
the  rate  of  inflation  can  bring  about  prior  changes  in 
monetary  growth-a  nontrivial  task. 
On  a  more  elementary  level,  it  must  be  conceded 
that  the  results  presented  in  Table  II  and  the  appen- 
dix  do  not  really  address  the  possibility  that  mone- 
tary  growth  rates  are  determined  at  least  partially  by 
prior  movements  in  the  rate  of  inflation.  We  have 
regressed  the  inflation  rate  only  on  current  and  past 
monetary  growth  rates.  Conceivably  there  is  also  a 
statistically  significant  relationship  between  inflation 
and  future  monetary  growth. 
Table  III 
COMPARISON  OF  MEAN  MONETARY  LAGS, 







United  States 
1958-67  1968-77 
Regressions  Regressions 
(quarters)  (quarters) 
6.6*  10.1* 
10.9*  9.0** 
7.6*  12.9** 
7.1**  10.7** 
13.0**  10.8” 
10.0**  6.4** 
* Significant  at  the  5  percent  level. 
**  Significant  at  the  1 percent  level. 
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this  possibility.  For  each  country  we  selected  a repre- 
sentative  equation  and  added  monetary  growth  in 
periods  t +  1 through  t +  4 as  explanatory  variables. 
The  numbers  in  the  table  are  “t”  statistics  on  the 
regression  coefficients  for  these  leading  monetary 
growth  terms.  It  can  readily  be  seen  that  not  a  single 
coefficient  was  statistically  significant  at  the  five  per- 
cent  level  in  the  first  three  future  quarters.  In  period 
t  +  4  only  three  of  the  14  countries  had  significant 
coefficients,  and  one  of  them  had  a  significant  nega- 
tive  coefficient.  Altogether  there  were  15  negative 
coefficients  among  the  56  estimates.  Negative  co- 
efficients,  of  course,  contradict  the  hypothesis  that 
central  banks  tend  to  validate  inflations  that  originate 
from  nonmonetary  disturbances  by  promoting  ac- 
celerated  monetary  growth. 
Not  surprisingly,  the  significant  negative  coeffi- 
cient  appeared  in  the  United  States  regression.  In 
fact,  all  four  U.  S.  coefficients  were  negative.  This 
result  suggests  that  the  Federal  Reserve’s  policy  re- 
action  function  is  quite  sensitive  to  inflation  develop- 
ments.  A  speed-up  in  U.  S.  inflation  tends  to  be 
followed  by  monetary  tightness  (i.e.,  slower  mone- 
tary  growth).  In  Canada  and  Sweden,  on  the  other 
hand,  this  evidence  suggests  a  considerably  more 
accommodationist  stance  by  their  central  banks. 
International  Transmission  of  Inflation  The  in- 
flation  equations  presented  in  this  article  do  not  pay 
explicit  attention  to  international  transmission  mech- 
anisms.  This  does  not  mean  that  we  think  that 
inflations  cannot  be  imported.  Obviously,  the  infla- 
Table  IV 
T-STATISTICS  ON  LEADING  RATES  OF 
MONETARY  GROWTH 
Eqn.  No.  t +  1  t+2  t+3  t+4 
Austria  1.2  .79  37  .29  -.21 
Belgium  2.2  .75  1.29  1.65  1.76 
Britain  3.3  -1.59  -1.55  .55  1.48 
Canada  4.4  .40  1.06  1.58  2.11* 
Denmark  5.3  .03  .74  1.00  1.16 
France  6.1  .16  1.47  .51  .39 
Germany  7.3  -1.15  .60  .06  -1.09 
Italy  8.2  .07  1.17  1.74  .49 
Netherlands  9.2  1.70  .85  .78  1.69 
Norway  10.2  .38  -.91  .44  -1.33 
Sweden  11.2  -.18  .70  .98  2.43* 
Switzerland  12.3  .73  .39  1.52  .22 
United  States  13.4  -1.77  -1.29  -1.17  -  2.37* 
Yugoslavia  14.3  -  .43  -1.46  -1.00  .45 
*  Significant  at  the  5  percent  level. 
tion  rates  in  all  of  the  countries  studied  here  are 
sensitive  in  some  degree  to  inflation  elsewhere;  this 
is  suggested  quite  strongly  by  the  chart,  which  shows 
broadly  similar  trends  across  countries.  Rather,  our 
model  can  be  interpreted  as  assuming  that  the  main 
way  in  which  inflation  is  transmitted  from  one  coun- 
try  to  another  is  via  external  influences  on  monetary 
growth. 
To  shed  further  light  on  the  international  trans- 
mission  issue,  we  carried  out  three  supplemental  em- 
pirical  exercises.  First,  we  ran  simple  correlation 
matrices  for  inflation  rates  and  for  monetary  growth 
rates  for  all  countries.  Second,  we  ran  further  re- 
gressions  for  the  United  States  with  lagged  values  of 
the  trade-weighted  value  of  the  dollar  as  added  vari- 
ables.  Third,  for  all  thirteen  countries  other  than  the 
United  States  we  ran  further  regressions  with  the 
U.  S.  MlB  growth  rate  as  an  additional  explanatory 
variable.  These  results  and  their  implications  are 
discussed  briefly  below. 
1.  The  Correlation  Matrices.  Pairwise  simple 
correlation  coefficients  among  the  quarterly  inflation 
rates  for  all  fourteen  countries  are  displayed  in 
Table  V.  Table  VI  contains  a  similar  display  for 
monetary  growth  rates,  except  that  Norway  has  been 
excluded  from  the  table. 
The  most  striking  feature  of  these  tables  is  the 
contrast  between  them.  Even  though  we  made  no 
allowance  for  possible  lagged  relationships  between 
countries,  all  of  the  inflation  correlation  coefficients 
are  positive  and  72  (of  84)  are  significantly  different 
from  zero.  On  the  other  hand,  23  (of  78)  money- 
growth  correlations  are  negative,  and  47  of  them  are 
not  significantly  different  from  zero.  Clearly,  infla- 
tion  is  much  more  strongly  correlated  across  coun- 
tries  than  monetary  growth  is. 
The  case  of  the  United  States  is  especially  worth 
noting.  Except  for  the  correlations  with  Belgium 
and  Britain  (.32  and  .37  respectively),  U.  S.  mone- 
tary  growth  was  correlated  either  very  weakly  or,  in 
the  case  of  Switzerland,  negatively  with  monetary 
growth  elsewhere  during  1958-77.  Despite  this,  the 
correlations  between  inflation  rates  in  the  United 
States  and  the  other  thirteen  countries  were  con- 
sistently  significant,  ranging  upward  from  .26  for 
Austria  to  .76  for  Belgium. 
2.  Exchange  Depreciation  and  U.  S.  Inflation. 
It  is  often  asserted  that  exchange  depreciation  pro- 
vides  an  important  mechanism  whereby  a  country 
may  import  inflation  from  its  trade  partners.  Accord- 
ing  to  this  argument,  if  it  takes  more  U.  S.  dollars 
(say)  to  buy  a  French  franc,  then  dollar  prices 
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United  States 
Yugoslavia 
.45 
.40  .72 
.26  .75  .65 
.24  .41  .33  .47 
.11  .44  .41  .42  .19 
.43  .52  .55  .36  .18  .25 
.33  .73  .63  .63  .57  .49  .45 
.54  .55  .59  .35  .35  .19  .60  .45 
.27  .44  .41  .38  .18  .22  .51  .48  .25 
.39  .67  .49  .60  .40  .52  .40  .68  .39  .53 
.31  .38  .28  .31  .33  .01  .41  .31  .33  .28  .20 
.26  .76  .61  .70  .43  .44  .40  .60  .42  .39  .52  .40 
.21  .38  .40  .26  .28  .04  .43  .36  .41  .17  .15  .39  .27 
Note:  Coefficients  that  exceed .22  are  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  5  percent  level  of  significance. 
of  French  imports  into  the  United  States  are  bound  case  in  which  the  direction  of  causality  is  under 
to  be  higher,  thus  exerting  upward  pressure  on  the  question. 
U.  S.  inflation  rate.  Despite  an  appealing  surface  We  have  tested  this  hypothesis  in  crude  fashion 
plausibility,  this  argument  suffers  from  the  difficulty  for  the  United  States  by  regressing  the  1958-79  in- 
that  most  instances  of  exchange  depreciation  can  be  flation  rate  on  MlB  growth  and  the  trade-weighted 
linked  to  either  actual  or  expected  inflation  at  rates  average  value  of  the  dollar  against  major  foreign 
exceeding  those  elsewhere.  Thus  we  have  another  currencies.  The  latter  variable  was  entered  four 
Table  VI 
MATRIX  OF  SIMPLE  CORRELATION  COEFFICIENTS:  QUARTERLY  MONETARY  GROWTH  RATES,  1958-77 
Belgium  .10 
Britain  -.04 
Canada  .07 
Denmark  .48 
France  .45 
Germany  .66 
Italy  .28 
Netherlands  .03 
Sweden  -.73 
Switzerland  .20 
United  States  .06 
Yugoslavia  .59 
.09 
.10  .38 
.16  -.18 
.05  -.01 
-.04  -.11 
-.11  .02 
.16  -.07 
.12  .22 
-.11  -  .25 
.32  .37 
-  .06  -  .03 
.10 
-.01  .61 
.02  .53  .67 
.07  .45  .73  .66 
-  .06  .13  .11  .13  .01 
.11  -.31  -  .39  -  .66  -  .29  .04 
-.13  .28  .33  .45  .50  .12  -.23 
.08  .08  .02  .02  .02  .21  .06  -  .05 
.13  .51  .58  .68  .63  -  .04  -  .53  .38  .02 
Note:  Coefficients  that  exceed .22  (in  absolute  value)  are  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  5  percent  level  of  significance. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  29 times,  with  lags  of  one  to  four  quarters.  None  of 
these  four  lagged  terms  were  significant:  their  re- 
spective  “t”  statistics  were  -.14,  -.45,  .37,  and 
-1.12.  Perhaps  more  thorough  testing  would  pro- 
duce  evidence  of  an  important  impact  of  exchange 
depreciation  on  U.  S.  inflation.  However,  these  pre- 
liminary  results  offer  no  support  to  this  particular 
version  of  the  imported-inflation  hypothesis. 
3.  U.  S.  Monetary  Growth  and  Foreign  Inflation. 
As  a  final  empirical  exercise  we  decided  to  explore 
the  consequences  of  substituting  U.  S.  monetary 
growth  for  own-country  monetary  growth  for  each  of 
the  thirteen  foreign  countries  included  in  this  study. 
The  main  features  of  these  results  are  listed  in  Table 
VII. 
In  every  country,  U.  S.  monetary  growth  proved 
to  be  a  significant  explanatory  variable-a  surprising 
result  in  view  of  the  absence  of  correlation  between 
monetary  growth  in  the  United  States  and  elsewhere. 
U.  S.  monetary  growth,  in  fact,  attained  higher  “t” 
statistics  than  domestic  monetary  growth  in  the  cases 
of  Britain,  Denmark,  Sweden,  and  Yugoslavia.  How- 
ever,  the  mean  lag  estimates  in  the  right-hand  col- 
umns  show  better  significance  levels-and  greater 
plausibility-when  each  country’s  own  monetary 
growth  rates  are  used.  Thus,  despite  the  unexpect- 
edly  close  relationship  between  monetary  growth  in 
the  United  States  and  inflation  elsewhere,  it  still 
Table  VII 
COMPARISON  OF  REGRESSION  RESULTS 
WITH  UNITED  STATES  AND  OWN 
MONETARY  GROWTH  RATES 
t-statistics  Mean Monetary 
on S  S  PCM  Lag 
Own  U.S.  Own  U.S. 
Eqn.  No.  PCM  PCM  PCM  PCM 
Austria  1.2  3.38  2.97  7.4**  10.0* 
Belgium  2.2  7.82  5.50  7.5**  7.5* 
Britain  3.3  8.10  8.12  9.2**  15.8** 
Canada  4.2  5.50  3.95  4.7*  4.3 
Denmark  5.3  2.07  2.60  10.1*  17.9* 
France  6.2  6.50  2.99  6.9**  9.5*  * 
Germany  7.3  2.91  2.36  5.8  6.7 
Italy  8.2  4.14  2.09  11.1**  13.3 
Netherlands  9.4  4.90  4.60  10.4**  10.2** 
Norway  10.2  5.01  2.26  13.2**  16.2** 
Sweden  11.2  5.40  5.64  9.7**  12.6*’ 
Switzerland  12.2  4.67  3.84  10.6**  -.4 
Yugoslavia  14.3  2.54  3.37  8.6**  6.4 
* Significant  at  5  percent  level. 
**Significant  at  1  percent  level. 
appears  that  in  most  instances  one  obtains  more  satis- 
factory  results  with  own-country  money  growth. 
4.  Tentative  Conclusions  on  the  Transmission 
Mechanism.  Admittedly,  we  have  not  probed  very 
deeply  into  the  question  of  how  inflation  gets  trans- 
mitted  from  one  country  to  another.  Nevertheless, 
we  believe  that  these  preliminary  findings  point  to- 
ward  cross-country  influences  on  monetary  growth 
rates  as  an  important  element  in  the  transmission 
mechanism. 
Our  main  results,  summarized  in  Section  II,  show 
that  each  country’s  monetary  growth  rate  has  played 
a  strong  but  delayed  role  in  its  inflation  experience 
during  1958-77.  Our  pairwise  simple  correlation  co- 
efficients  indicate  that  monetary  growth  rates  are  not 
closely  correlated  across  countries.  Yet  we  have 
found  a  surprisingly  close  relationship  between  U.  S. 
monetary  growth  and  foreign  inflation. 
The  key  to  understanding  this  paradoxical  set  of 
results  lies  in  the  lag  estimates  reported  in  Table  VII. 
Note  that  eight  of  the  thirteen  regressions  with  U.  S. 
monetary  growth  substituted  for  own  monetary 
growth  produced  statistically  significant  monetary 
coefficients.  In  six  of  these  eight  cases,  lags  were 
longer-sometimes  substantially  longer-when  U.  S. 
monetary  growth  was  used.  In  a  seventh  case  (Bel- 
gium)  the  lag  estimates  for  U.  S.  and  own  monetary 
growth  were  identical,  and  in  the  eighth  case  (the 
Netherlands)  the  estimates  were  virtually  identical. 
There  is  a  strong  suggestion,  therefore,  that  U.  S. 
monetary  growth  influences  foreign  inflation  pri- 
marily  through  a  delayed  impact  on  foreign  mone- 
tary  growth.  Because  the  correlation  coefficients  of 
U.  S.  monetary  growth  and  monetary  growth  in  the 
thirteen  other  countries  take  no  account  of  lags,  they 
turn  out  to  be  weak,  but  this  does  not  mean  that  they 
are  not  in  fact  closely  related. 
It  should  be  recalled  that  during  most  of  our  study 
period  the  world  was  operating  under  the  Bretton 
Woods  system  of  pegged  exchange  rates.  The  rules 
of  this  system  required  each  central  bank  to  maintain 
the  external  value  of  its  currency  within  a  narrow 
band  around  a  stated  par  value.  Thus  a  tendency 
for  a  country’s  currency  to  (say)  appreciate  vis-à-vis 
the  dollar  would  require  its  central  bank  to  buy 
dollars  on  the  foreign  exchange  market.  Ordinarily 
such  purchases  would  result  in  a  more  rapid  growth 
in  the  country’s  monetary  base,  and  ultimately  in  its 
money  supply.  If  we  assume  (as  is  plausible)  that 
the  original  disturbance  in  the  foreign  exchange  mar- 
ket  reflected  a  speed-up  in  U.  S.  monetary  growth, 
then  we  have  a  situation  in  which  more  rapid  mone- 
30  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1981 tary  growth  in  the  United  States  leads,  with  a  lag,  to 
more  rapid  monetary  growth  in  other  countries. 
This  does  not  deny  the  possibility  of  other  sorts  of 
international  transmission  mechanisms,  including 
even  direct  expectational  links  between  a  country’s 
inflation  rate  and  that  of  its  principal  trade  partners. 
The  strong  correlation  coefficients  of  inflation  rates 
across  countries  are  consistent  with  this  type  of  link. 
Clearly,  many  puzzles  remain  with  respect  to  the 
transmission  question.  We  expect  to  extend  the  work 
reported  here  by, examining  the  lag  structures  among 
monetary  growth  rates  for  the  various  countries.  We 
also  intend  to  compare  results  for  the  Bretton  Woods 
portion  of  our  period,  1958-72,  with  more  recent 
results  under  floating  exchange  rates. 
IV. 
CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
In  this  article  we  have  developed  a  simple  model 
that  attempts  to  explain  inflation  primarily  as  the 
result  of  current  and  past  monetary  growth  rates.  In 
addition,  our  model  allows  for  energy-price  shocks, 
the  effects  of  wage-price  controls,  and  the  impact  on 
inflation  rates  from  changes  in  value-added  tax  rates. 
For  the  period  1958-77,  and  for  various  subperi- 
ods,  we  have  developed  quarterly  inflation  equations 
for  the  United  States,  Canada,  and  twelve  European 
countries.  In  each  country  we  found  statistically 
significant  regression  coefficients  on  the  sum  of  the 
current  and  nineteen  lagged  monetary  growth  rates. 
We  also  found  in  each  country  that  the  estimated 
mean  lag  between  monetary  growth  and  inflation  was 
very  long-it  ranged  from  a  minimum  of  one  year  to 
over  three  years  at  the  maximum.  On  the  other 
hand,  other  explanatory  factors-the  relative  prices 
of  energy,  changes  in  value-added  tax  rates,  and  the 
use  of  wage-price  controls-were  important  in  some 
countries,  unimportant  in  others.  They  did  not  ex- 
hibit  the  same  degree  of  consistency  in  their  contribu- 
tions  to  inflation  as  monetary  growth  did. 
As  far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned,  the  find- 
ings  reported  here  are  consistent  with  previously 
published  studies.  The  main  novelty  of  the  present 
work  is  its  extension  of  the  U.  S.  results  to  other 
countries,  employing  as  nearly  as  possible  a  common 
format  for  all  countries.  Despite  the  obvious  poten- 
tial  pitfalls  in  this  approach,  we  believe  that  this 
exercise  in  cross-country  comparisons  has  provided  a 
useful  perspective  which  suggests  a  substantial  simi- 
larity  across  countries  with  respect  to  the  nature  of 
the  inflation  problem.  Everywhere  the  main  diffi- 
culty  has  been  excessive  monetary  growth.  A  return 
to  reasonably  stable  prices  will  require  much  slower 
monetary  growth  in  the  future  than  during  the  past 
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